THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:
INDIA’S MEMBERSHIP AND ACCESSION TO SOME HAGUE CONVENTIONS
by Ramni Taneja


Private International Law: meaning and scope
In a fascinating description of the meaning of Private International Law, Cheshire and North’s famous treatise entitled Private International Law provides a close glimpse into this complex area of law, which is inextricably linked to the advancing pace of globalization and modern developments both in law and in society. In the trenchant words of the authors[1]:
“The raison d’etre of private international law is the existence in the world of a number of separate municipal systems of law – a number of separate legal units – that differ greatly from each other in the rules by which they regulate the various legal relations arising in daily life. Courts in one country must frequently take account of some rule of law that exists in another. A sovereign is supreme within his own territory and according to the universal maxim of jurisprudence, he has exclusive jurisdiction over everybody and everything within that territory and over every transaction that is affected there. He can, if he chooses, refuse to consider any law but his own. Although the adoption of this policy of indifference might have been common enough in other ages, it is impracticable in the modern civilized world. Consequently, nations have long found that they cannot, by sheltering behind the principles of territorial sovereignty, afford to disregard foreign rules of law merely because they happen to be different from their own internal system of law. Moreover…. it is no derogation of sovereignty to take account of foreign law.”

The same authors[2] graphically set the tone and scene for the scope of private international law:

“Private international law is not a separate branch of law in the same sense, as say the law of contract or of tort. It is all pervading.
‘It starts up unexpectedly in any court and in the midst of any process. It may be sprung like a mine in a plain common law action, in an administrative proceeding in equity, or in a divorce case, or a bankruptcy case, in a shipping case or a matter of criminal procedure………..The most trivial action of debt, the most complex case of equitable claims, may be suddenly interrupted by the appearance of a knot to be untied only by Private International Law’[3].”


The Hague Conference on Private International law
The Hague has been appropriately described as the “Legal Capital of the World”[4]. In the words of the website of the Hague Conference on Private International Law[5], it has since 1893, been a “melting pot of different legal traditions”. It has also developed and serviced Conventions which respond to global needs in various areas of law, including international protection of children, family and property relations, international legal cooperation and litigation and international commercial and finance law.

The Hague Conference is the oldest of the international legal institutions in the Hague. It is unique in that it is the only intergovernmental organization with a ‘legislative’ mission. However, its ‘laws’ take the form of multilateral treaties or conventions and are primarily aimed at facilitating not the relations between States, but rather the lives of their citizens, private and commercial, in cross-border relationships and transactions.[6]



Globalization and India’s admission as a member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law

With the advent of globalization which is considered as one of the pivotal factors that have propelled India on the world stage, there is a growing awareness of the need for India to be considered as an integral part of the international legal community as well. In a Press Release issued on 3rd May 2007, the Union Cabinet approved of India becoming a Member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. This Press Release further notes that the Hague Conference on Private International Law is an inter-governmental organization. The main purpose of the Conference is to work for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law by finding internationally agreed approaches to issues such as jurisdiction of courts, applicable law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments in a wide range of areas such as commercial laws, international civil procedures and matters relating to child protection, marriage and personal issues. The issues dealt with and the Conventions adopted by the Hague Conference are of great practical relevance to India in view of its large diaspora, increasing trade relations and travel abroad by Indian citizens. As a Member State, India would be entitled to participate in all the meetings and conferences.India would also have a role in deciding on the future work programme[7]. On Thursday, 13 March 2008, India deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law and became the 69th Member of the Organization[8].

Hague Conventions: India’s accession to certain Hague Conventions
India is already a Party to the following Hague Conventions:
Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents[9]: This is popularly described as the Hague Apostille Convention. India acceded to this Convention on 26th October 2004 and it entered into force on 14th July 2005[10].
Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters[11]: India acceded to this Convention on 23rd November 2006 and this Convention entered into force on 1st August 2007.
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters[12]: India acceded to this Convention on 7th February 2007 and this Convention entered into force on 8th April 2007.
Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Inter-country Adoption[13]: India acceded to this Convention on 6th June 2003 and this Convention entered into force on 1st October 2003.

Ministry of External Affairs of India[14]: Implementation of the Hague Apostille Convention
With India’s accession to the Hague Convention of October 5, 1961 abolishing the requirement of legalization of foreign public documents (www.hcch.net) the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs at CPV Division, Patiala House, New Delhi, has started issuing Apostilles with effect from August 29, 2007. Apostille stickers will be issued on the following documents: i.e. personal documents like birth, death, affidavits, powers of attorney, marriage etc and educational documents like degrees, diplomas, matriculation and secondary level certificates. However, commercial documents are excluded from the purview of this Convention. Procedure: All documents should be first authenticated by the designated agencies in the State from where the document has been issued. In case of personal documents, Home Department/General Administration Department are the designated authorities. In case of educational documents, State Governments have now opened Regional Authentication Centers (RACs) at various States from where the document should first be attested. Documents attested by these authorities then need to be presented to MEA for issue of Apostilles. Fee: A fee of Rs. 50/- in the form of Postal/Pay Order drawn in favour of PAO, MEA, New Delhi is payable for each Apostille sticker.


Law Commission of India: its recommendations
In its commendable 65th Report on the Recognition of Foreign Divorces[15], the Law Commission of India has given an elaborate overview of the legal position in this regard. It has also analyzed at length and in considerable detail, the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations[16] and it has also examined the legal position in different parts of the world, including the United States of America and England, United Kingdom. The Law Commission has also considered the Indian legal position and the position in terms of private international law as well. It has recommended the enactment of a special law in India for the purpose of the recognition of foreign divorces and separations.

In its 218th Report[17] explaining the Need to Accede to the Hague Convention with regard to the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction[18], the Law Commission has strongly recommended that India must become a party to this Convention. This is a salutary recommendation, particularly since the great Indian Diaspora which is spread all over the world, invariably faces problems in marriages, divorces and also in the very sensitive issue pertaining to the custody of children.


Supreme Court of India: The treaty making powers under the Constitution of India
One of the finest expositions of the power to enter a treaty has been illuminatingly analysed by the Supreme Court of India in Union of India and another vs Azadi Bachao Andalon and another[19]. By this judgment, the Supreme Court of India upheld the validity of the Circular dated 13th April 2000 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes by which certain instructions were given to the Chief Commissioners/Directors of Income-tax with regard to the assessment of cases in which the Indo-Mauritius Double Taxation Avoidance Convention, 1983 was applied. The Supreme Court’s observations with regard to the provisions of the Constitution of India containing the powers to enter into treaties are quoted hereafter:

”20. The power of entering into a treaty is an inherent part of the sovereign power of the State. By Article 73, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union extends to the matters with respect to which the Parliament has power to make laws. Our Constitution makes no provision making legislation a condition for the entry into an international treaty in time either of war or peace. The executive power of the Union is vested in the President and is exercisable in accordance with the Constitution. The Executive is qua the State competent to represent the State in all matters international and may by agreement, convention or treaty incur obligations which in international law are binding upon the State. But the obligations arising under the agreement or treaties are not by their own force binding upon Indian nationals. The power to legislate in respect of treaties lies with the Parliament under entries 10 and 14 of the List I of the Seventh Schedule. But making of law under that authority is necessary when the treaty or agreement operates to restrict the rights of citizens or others or modifies the law of the State. If the rights of the citizens or others which are justiciable are not affected, no legislative measure is needed to give effect to the agreement or treaty [See in this connection Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel and Others vs. Union of India and another)”.
Another path-breaking decision on the reliance by the Supreme Court of international conventions in the absence of such laws in domestic law, is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vishaka and others vs State of Rajasthan and others[20]. In this leading authority on the issue of prevention of sexual harassment at the workplace, the Supreme Court relied on the ratification by the Government of India of a resolution passed in June 1993, at the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing concerning the formulation of a national policy on women, including the defence of women’s rights and declared that these ought to be read into the Constitution. In the eloquent words of the court:

“Before we refer to the international conventions and norms having relevance in this field and the manner in which they assume significance in application and judicial interpretation, we may advert to some other provisions in the Constitution which permit such use. These provisions are:Article 51:
"51. Promotion of international peace and security - The State shall endeavour to - (c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised people with one another; andArticle 253:
253. Legislation for giving effect to international agreements - Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body .

"Seventh Schedule:" List I - Union List: 14. Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries.In the absence of domestic law occupying the field, to formulate effective measures to check the evil of sexual harassment of working women at all work places, the contents of International Conventions and norms are significant for the purpose of interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality, right to work with human dignity in Articles 14, 15 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and the safe guards against sexual harassment implicit therein. Any International Convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional guarantee. This is implicit from Article 51(c) and enabling power of the Parliament to enact laws for implementing the International Conventions and norms by virtue of Article 253 read with Entry 14 of the Union List in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Article 73 also is relevant. It provides that the executive power of the Union shall extend to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws. The executive power of the Union is, therefore, available till the Parliament enacts to expressly provide measures needed to curb the evil. Thus, the power of this Court under Article 32 for enforcement of the fundamental rights and the executive power of the Union have to meet the challenge to protect the working women from sexual harassment and o make their fundamental rights meaningful. Governance of the society by the rule of law mandates this requirements as a logical concomitant of the constitutional scheme.
The meaning and content of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India are of sufficient amplitude to compass all the facets of gender equality including prevention of sexual harassment or abuse. Independence of Judiciary forms a part of our constitutional scheme. The international conventions and norms are to be read into them in the absence of enacted domestic law occupying the fields when there is no inconsistency between them. It is now an accepted rule of judicial construction that regard must be had to international conventions and norms for construing domestic law when there is noinconsistency between them and there is a void in the domestic law.


Supreme Court of India on the Hague Conventions
In certain important judgments dealing with custody of children and other related matrimonial issues, including divorce, the Supreme Court has noted the existence and relevance of the Hague Conventions. In Dhanwanti Joshi vs Madhav Unde[21], the Supreme Court has held as follows:
“32. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the Hague Convention of 1980 on "Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction". As of today, about 45 countries are parties to this Convention. India is not yet a signatory. Under the Convention, any child below 16 years who had been "wrongfully" removed or retained in another contracting State, could be returned back to the country from which the child had been removed, by application to a central authority. Under Article 16 of the Convention, if in the process, the issue goes before a court, the Convention prohibits the court from going into the merits of the welfare of the child. Article 12 requires the child to be sent back, but if a period of more than one year has lapsed from the date of removal to the date of commencement of the proceedings before the court, the child would still be returned unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. Article 12 is subject to Article 13 and a return could be refused if it would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable position or if the child is quite mature and objects to its return. In England, these aspects are covered by the Child Abduction and Custody Act, 198533. So far as non-Convention countries are concerned, or where the removal related to a period before adopting the Convention, the law is that the court in the country to which the child is removed will consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign court as only a factor to be taken into consideration as stated in McKee v. McKee unless the Court thinks it fit to exercise summary jurisdiction in the interests of the child and its prompt return is for its welfare, as explained in L., Re (CA). As recently as 1996-1997, it has been held in P (A minor) (Child Abduction : Non-Convention Country), Re ( 1996 (3) FCR 233, CA) by Ward, L.J. (1996 Current Law Year Book, pp. 165-166) that in deciding whether to order the return of a child who has been abducted from his or her country of habitual residence - which was not a party to the Hague Convention, 1980, - the courts' overriding consideration must be the child's welfare. There is no need for the Judge to attempt to apply the provisions of Article 13 of the Convention by ordering the child's return unless a grave risk of harm was established. See also A (A minor) (Abduction : Non-Convention Country) (Re, The Times 3-7-97 by Ward, L.J. (CA) (quoted in Current Law, August 1997, p. 13). This answers the contention relating to removal of the child from USA”

Y Narasimha Rao and others vs Y. Venkata Lakshmi and others[22]
This is a controversial judgment of the Supreme Court of India, dealing with various aspects of private international law, the Hague Conventions and the recognition of foreign divorces. Some of the conclusions that have been reached in this judgment have given rise to considerable debate, especially from the perspective of private international law.
It is the author’s humble view that the Indian legal landscape has been metamorphosed since 1991 which is when this judgment was passed by the Supreme Court of India. The metamorphosis is occasioned due to the liberalization by the Government of India of the policy of Foreign Direct Investment. There is a large Indian Diaspora in the world now. The ratio of the judgment, especially in the context that the foreign court’s divorce decree must be in accordance with the law of the parties under which they were married so as to afford recognition under Indian law, is with the utmost respect and deference to the court, rather impracticable. The conclusions of the court concerning jurisdiction and other crucial factors are of course laudatory. However, there are situations which do arise in certain cases in which both the parties are permanently domiciled and/or habitually resident overseas. There may be matrimonial differences between these parties. Inevitably the cause of action with reference to these matrimonial differences would arise within the overseas matrimonial home. The foreign court is obligated to apply its own laws and not the laws of the parties under which they were married. Indian matrimonial statutes do not have extra-territorial jurisdiction. These are practical and legal conundrums that may arise if the ratio of the decision in Narasimha Rao vs Venkata Lakshmi is applied in cases being considered by Indian courts. There is therefore an urgent necessity for the Supreme Court to carefully re-consider the ratio of this decision, as the present ratio is bound to lead to complications of interpretation in existing and future cases that deal with recognition of foreign divorce decrees. Since this is perhaps one of the most far reaching decisions in the present context, some of its pertinent paragraphs are quoted verbatim hereafter:

“11. The rules of Private International Law in this country are not codified and are scattered in different enactments such as the Civil Procedure Code, the Contract Act, the Indian Succession Act, the Indian Divorce Act, the Special Marriage Act etc. In addition, some rules have also been evolved by judicial decisions. In matters of status or legal capacity of natural persons, matrimonial disputes, custody of children, adoption, testamentary and intestate succession etc. the problem in this country is complicated by the fact that there exist different personal laws and no uniform rule can be laid down for all citizen. The distinction between matters which concern personal and family affairs and those which concern commercial relationships, civil wrongs etc. is well recognised in other countries and legal systems. The law in the former area tends to be primarily determined and influenced by social, moral and religious considerations, and public policy plays a special and important role in shaping it. Hence, in almost all the countries the jurisdictional, procedural and substantive rules which are applied to disputes arising in this area are significantly different from those applied to claims in other areas. That is as it ought to be. For, no country can afford to satisfies its internal unity, stability and tranquillity for the sake of uniformity of rules and comity of nations which considerations are important and appropriate to facility international trade, commerce, industry, communicator, transport, exchange of services, technology, manpower etc. This glaring fact of national life has been recognised both by the Hague Convention of 1968 on the Recognition of Divorce and Legal Separations as well as by the Judgments Convention of the European Community of the same year. Article 10 of the Hague Convention expressly provides that the contracting States may refuse to recognise a divorce or legal separation if such recognition is manifestly incompatible with their public policy. The Judgments Convention of the European Community expressly excludes from its scope (a) status or legal capacity of natural persons, (b) rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, (c) wills and succession, (d) social security, and (e) bankruptcy. A separate convention was contemplated for the last of the subjects12. We are in the present case concerned only with the matrimonial law and what we state here will apply strictly to matters arising out of and ancillary to matrimonial disputes. The courts in this country have so far tried to follow in these matters the English rules of Private International Law whether common law rules or statutory rules. The dependence on English law even in matters which are purely personal, has however time and again been regretted. But nothing much has been done to remedy the situation. The labours of the Law Commission poured in its 65th Report on this very subject have not fructified since April 1976, when the Report was submitted. Even the British were circumspect and hesitant to apply their rules of law in such matters during their governance of this country and had left the family law to be governed by the customary rules of the different communities. It is only where there was a void that they had stepped in by enactments such as the Special Marriage Act, Indian Divorce Act, Indian Succession Act etc. In spite, however, of more than 43 years of independence we find that the legislature has not though it fit to enact rules of Private International Law in this area and in the absence of such initiative from the legislature the courts in this country have been forced to fall back upon precedents which have taken their inspiration, as stated earlier, from the English rules. Even in doing so they have not been uniform in practice with the result that we have some conflicting decisions in the area13. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that today more than ever in the past, the need for definitive rules for recognition of foreign judgments in personal and family matters, and particularly in matrimonial disputes has surged to the surface. Many a man and woman of this land with different personal laws have migrated and are migrating to different countries either to make their permanent abode there or for temporary residence. Likewise their is also immigration of the nationals of other countries. The advancement in communication and transpiration has also made it easier for individuals to hop from one country to another. It is also not unusual to come across cases where citizens of this country have been contracting marriages either in this country or abroad with nationals of the other countries or among themselves, or having married here, either both or one of them migrate to other countries. There are also cases where parties having married here have been either domiciled or residing separately in different foreign countries. This migration, temporary or permanent, has also been giving rise to various kinds of matrimonial disputes destroying in its turn the family and its peace. A large number of foreign decrees in matrimonial matters is becoming the order of the day. A time has, therefore, come to ensure certainly in the recognition of the foreign judgments in these matters. The minimum rules of guidance for securing the certainty need not await legislative initiative. This Court can accomplish the modest job within the framework of the present statutory provisions if they are rationally interpreted and extended to achieve the purpose. It is with this intention that we are undertaking this venture. We are aware that unaided and left solely to our resources the rules of guidance which we propose to lay down in this area may prove inadequate or miss some aspects which may not be present to us at this juncture. But a beginning has to be made as best as one can, the lacunae and the errors being left to be filled in and corrected by future judgments14. We believe that the relevant provisions of Section 13 of the Code are capable of being interpreted to secure the required certainty in the sphere of this branch of law in conformity with public policy, justice, equity and good conscience, and the rules so evolved will protect the sanctity of the institution of marriage and the unity of family which are the cornerstones of our societal life15. Clause (a) of Section 13 states that a foreign judgment shall not be recognised if it has not been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction. We are of the view that this clause should be interpreted to mean that only that court will be a court of competent jurisdiction which the Act or the law under which the parties are married recognises as a court of competent jurisdiction to entertain the matrimonial dispute. Any other court should be held a court without jurisdiction unless both parties voluntarily and unconditionally subject themselves to the jurisdiction of that court. The expression "competent court" in Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act has also to be construed likewise.16. Clause (b) of Section 13 states that if a foreign judgment has not been given on the merits of the case, the courts in this country will not recognise such judgment. This clause should be interpreted to mean (a) that the decision of the foreign court should be on a ground available under the law under which the parties are married, and (b) that the decision should be a result of the contest between the parties. The latter requirement is fulfilled only when the respondent is duly served and voluntarily and unconditionally submits himself/herself to the jurisdiction of the court and contests the claim, or agrees to the passing of the decree with or without appearance. A mere filing of the reply to the claim under protest and without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, or an appearance in the court either in person or though a representative for objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, should not be considered as a decision on the merits of the case. In this respect the general rules of the acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the court which may be valid in other matters and areas should be ignored and deemed inappropriate17. The second part of clause (c) of Section 13 states that where the judgment is founded on a refusal to recognise the law of this country in cases in which such law is applicable, the judgment will not be recognised by the courts in this country. The marriages which take place in this country can only be under either the customary or the statutory law in force in this country. Hence, the only law that can be applicable to the matrimonial disputes is the one under which the parties are married, and no other law. When, therefore, a foreign judgment is founded on a jurisdiction or on a ground not recognised by such law, it is a judgment which is in defiance of the law. Hence, it is not conclusive of the matters adjudicated therein and, therefore, unenforceable in this country. For the same reason, such a judgment will also be unenforceable under clause (f) of Section 13, since such a judgment would obviously be in breach of the matrimonial law in force in this country18. Clause (d) of Section 13 which makes a foreign judgment unenforceable on the ground that the proceedings in which it is obtained are opposed to natural justice, states no more than an elementary principle on which any civilised system of justice rests. However, in matters concerning the family law such as the matrimonial disputes, this principle has to be extended to mean something more than mere compliance with the technical rules of procedure. If the rule of audi alteram partem has any meaning with reference to the proceedings in a foreign court, for the purposes of the rule it should not be deemed sufficient that the respondent has been duly served with the process of the court. It is necessary to ascertain whether the respondent was in a position to present or represent himself/herself and contest effectively the said proceedings. This requirement should apply equally to the appellate proceedings if and when they are filed by either party. If the foreign court has not ascertained and ensured such effective contest by requiring the petitioner to make all necessary provisions for the respondent to defend including the cost of travel, residence and litigation where necessary, it should be held that the proceedings are in breach of the principles of natural justice. It is for this reason that we find that the rules of Private International Law of some countries insist, even in commercial matters, that the action should be filed in the forum where the defendant is either domiciled or is habitually resident. It is only in special cases which is called special jurisdiction where the claim has some real link with other forum that a judgment of such forum is recognised. This jurisdictional principle is also recognised by the Judgments Convention of the European Community. If, therefore, the courts in this country also insist as a matter of rule that foreign matrimonial judgment will be recognised only if it is of the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides, the provisions of clause (d) may be held to have been satisfied19. The provisions of clause (e) of Section 13 which requires that the courts in this country will not recognise a foreign judgment if it has been obtained by fraud, is self-evident. However, in view of the decision of this Court in Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh (1975 1 SCC 120) it must be understood that the fraud need not be only in relation to the merits of the matter but may also be in relation to jurisdictional facts20. From the aforesaid discussion the following rule can be deduced for recognised a foreign matrimonial judgment in this country. The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule may be as follows : (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (iii) where the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties21. The aforesaid rule with its stated exceptions has the merit of being just and equitable. It does no injustice to any of the parties. The parties do and ought to know their rights and obligations when they marry under a particular law. They cannot be heard to make a grievance about it later or allowed to bypass it by subterfuges as in the present case. The rule also has an advantage of rescuing the institution of marriage from the uncertain maze of the rules of the Private International Law of the different countries with regard to jurisdiction and merits based variously on domicile, nationality, residence - permanent or temporary or ad hoc, forum, proper law etc. and ensuring certainty in the most vital field of national life and conformity with public policy. The rule further takes account of the needs of modern life and makes due allowance to accommodated them. Above all, it gives protection to woman, the most vulnerable section of our society, whatever the strata to which they may belong. In particular it frees them from the bondage of the tyrannical and servile rule that wife's domicile follows that of her husband and that it is the husband's domiciliary law which determines the jurisdiction and judges the merits of the case22. Since with regard to the jurisdiction of the forum as well as the ground on which it is passed the foreign decree in the present case is not in accordance with the Act under which the parties were married, and the respondent had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court or consented to its passing, it cannot be recognised by the courts in this country and is, therefore, unenforceable”.

Conclusion
There is an urgent need to bring about a true and proper unification of the rules of private international law in India. As India is fully poised in her capacity as a nation whose economy is steadily growing, despite a world recession, it is equally critical for India to ensure that its pace of economic growth is accompanied by a healthy and viable legal visibility in the international arena and particularly in the realm of private international law. This is poignantly relevant in the case of private international law in terms of matrimonial disputes as discussed hereinabove. It is therefore imperative that the Government of India may consider enacting appropriate legislation which will ensure that the great Indian Diaspora is fully protected both in the letter and the spirit of the law. Apart from the Indian Diaspora, it is equally relevant that India has a proper role to play in the Hague Conference on Private International Law. As a responsible Member State of the Hague Conference on Private International law, it must demonstrate its willingness to ensure that any creases or wrinkles in the realm of private international law, need to be ironed out. The anomalies and the very obvious inconsistencies that are prevalent in the judgment of Narasimha Rao vs. Venkata Lakshmi can be properly rectified either by a re-consideration by the Supreme Court of the ratio of this decision or by India’s accession to the appropriate and specific Hague Conventions concerning the recognition of foreign divorces and separations or by Parliament passing appropriate legislation under Indian law. This is the need of the hour so that India too emerges as a key player in the area of private international law, with the purpose of properly uniting and reconciling the legal and judicial strands that form an integral part of the tapestry of various legal systems, culminating in a proper and judicious harmonization of the principles of private international law.









[1] Chapter 1: Definition, nature and scope of Private International Law, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, 13th edition, page 4, published by LexisNexis Butterworths
[2] Chapter 1, page 7, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law 13th Edition, 2004, published by LexisNexis Butterworths
[3] Frederic Harrison, Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws, pp 101-102, quoted in Chapter 1, on page 7 in Cheshire and North’s Private International Law 13th Edition, 2004, published by LexisNexis Butterworths
[4] The Hague: Legal Capital of the World, Editors: Peter K. van Krieken, David McKay, TMC, Asser Press, The Hague
[5] http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php



[6] Chapter 14: The Hague Conference on Private International Law, by J.H.A. van Loon , fromThe Hague: Legal Capital of the World, Editors: Peter K. van Krieken, David McKay, TMC, Asser Press, The Hague

[7] Press Information Bureau
[8] http://hcch.evision.nl/index_en.php?act=events.details&year=2008&varevent=142&zoek=statute

[9] http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=41

[10] http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=41

[11] http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=17

[12] http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=82

[13] http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69

[14] http://meaindia.nic.in/apostille.htm

[15] http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/Report65.pdf, April 1976
[16] http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=80

[17] http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report218.pdf , March 2009
[18]http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24

[19] 2004 (10) SCC 1
[20] 1997 (6) SCC 241
[21] 1998 (1) SCC 112
[22] 1991 (3) SCC 451